

# Learning the lessons from bridge collapses around the world

Mungo Stacy

Principal Engineer, Parsons Brinckerhoff

"Failure is central to engineering ... every single calculation that an engineer makes is a failure calculation.

Successful engineering is all about understanding how things break or fail."

*Henry Petroski*

# Tay bridge – 28 Dec 1879




# Tacoma Narrows – 7 Nov 1940



# Milford Haven – 2 June 1970



# Ynys-y-gwas – 4 Dec 1985



# MacArthur Maze – 29 Apr 2007





# Cameroon – 1 July 2004





# Montreal – 30 Sept 2006



# Minnesota – 1 Aug 2007



Fenghuang, China - 14 Aug 2007



# Can Tho, Vietnam – 26 Sept 2007





# I35E Minnesota – 26 July 2008



Czech republic – 8 Aug 2008



# Delhi Metro – 20 Oct 2008





Minnesota – 15 Nov 2008



Hanoi, Vietnam – 10 Mar 2009



# Zhuzhou, China – 17 May 2009



Kerry – 7 Feb 2007



# Ludlow – 26 June 2007




# Shropshire – 22 Oct 2008





# Selby - 2001





# Gerrards Cross – 30 June 2005



# Millennium Bridge – 12 June 2000



# Liverpool St GE19 – 28 May 2008





# Clyde Arc – 14 Jan 2008



# Learning the lessons from bridge collapses



Minnesota  
*I35W Highway  
bridge*

Built  
1967

Collapsed  
Aug 2007



Montreal  
*de la Concorde  
overpass*

Built  
1971

Collapsed  
Sept 2006

















# Bridge owning agency

“...recognised nationally and internationally as a leading Transportation Agency and a model for both the nation and other countries”

“...consulted by several European countries regarding best practices”



# Bridge owning agency

“...from fiscal year 2001 to 2007, the number of Department staff declined by 19%”

“...departure of professional staff, particularly senior engineers”

“The Department and other similar departments around the county have lost engineers to more lucrative or interesting positions in the private sector”

# Bridge owning agency

“...various organisational structures during the years since its creation...”

“...many people commented on the low moral that currently exists in the Department...”

“...the agency has lost substantial administrative infrastructure support, which has placed a greater burden on the professional staff to perform administrative and clerical tasks”

I	ITEM	RATING	COMMENTS AND SKETCHES				
			Refer to item number in comments and sketches	Use additional sheets if necessary			
SUBSTRUCTURE							
1	Abutments	7 7 7	1) SO ABUT. BRIDGE SENT - CRACKING AND DISCOLORED.				
2	Piers	6 6 6	2) PIER 7 (PIED PIER ON NO. ENDS OF RIVER WEST ABUTMENT IS CRACKED VERTICALLY COMPLETELY THROUGH COLUMN.				
SUPERSTRUCTURE							
3	Trusses	7 7 7	3) SMALL AREAS OF SEVERE CORROSION OCCURRING, ESPECIALLY UNDER MEDIAN JOINT. AND A SMALL AMOUNT OF CORROSION ON LOWER MOIST (EAST) JUST SOUTH OF PIER 8				
4	Girders	N N N	4) SEE 3) ABOVE.				
5	Floor Beams	7 7 7	5) SOME OF THE JOINTS TOO TIGHT.				
6	Stringers or Beams	8 8 8	6) DIET 8 DEBE UNDER 100% L.R. BEARINGS - NO INDICATION THAT BEAMS ARE MOVING AS MUCH AS DESIGN TO HAVE.				
7	Bearing Devices	7 7 7	7) IS 20% OF GAGE. RAIL BASE IS UNSOUND.				
DECKS							
8	Expansion Joints	7 7 7	8) 200-300 L.F. OF TRANSVERSE CRACKS IN LOW SCUMPS OVERLAP -				
9	Railing CODE 12	6 6 6	12) FACE OF CURB STARTING TO SPALL IN SPOTS.				
10	Structural Slab	8 7 6	13) SEE 5) ABOVE - MAY BE A PAVEMENT PRESSURE PROBLEM.				
11	Wearing Surface	7 7 7	14) NO HAZARDOUS MARKINGS				
12	Curb & Walk	7 7 7	20) 4-5% RAIN UNSOUND				
AREA UNDER BRIDGE							
13	Channel & Protection	8 8 8	21) DRAINS PERMANENTLY PLUGGED. -				
14	Roadway, Railway, Other	8 8 8	15) 5) 7) 8) 11) 12) 19) 20) 21) 23) NO CHANGE.				
15	Slopes & Berms	8 8 8	2) SEE 2) ABOVE. SOME OF THE PIER JOINTS AT THE NORTH END OF THE BRIDGE - ASSIGNED WITH THE SLAB SPANS ARE ADEQUATELY DETENTIONATED -				
CULVERTS							
16	Barrel & Floor	N N N	3) SEE 8) ABOVE - ALSO STRIP SEAL GLAND IS COMING OUT OF THE RAILING SLAB IN SEVERAL PLACES (NORTH END OF BRIDGE)				
17	Apron & Wings	N N N	16) BOTTOM OF SLAB, CAPING, & MEDIAN DETENTIONATED IN MANY PLACES - ESPECIALLY WEST END				
OTHER							
18	Retaining Wall	N N N	ESTIMATED COST OF REPAIR (\$/S.F.)				
19	Approaches	7 7 7	REVIEWED				
20	Signing	7 7 7					
21	Paint (yr. ptd.) 1968	7 7 7					
22	Drainage	7 7 6					
23	Guard Rail #5	8 8 8					
24	CONCRETE	8 8 8					
25							
Inspected by			Labor	Material	Equipment	Total	By Engineer
Date 6/14/83							
Date 5/17/83							
Date 5/17/83							
Date 5/17/83							

# Inspections

Form 17108 (12-71)

Minnesota Department of Highways

## 1972 BRIDGE INSPECTION REPORT

Prepare 4 copies:  
☐ Original to District Engineer  
☐ First copy to Area Maintenance Engineer  
☐ Second & Third copies to Central Operations

Bridge No. 9340	Check One: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> annual inspection <input type="checkbox"/> special inspection	Date 11-29-72	Year Built 1967
Maintenance Area 5A	T. H. No. 35W	Mile Post 18.43	Location 2 Mi. N. of I-94
Type B.S. & 3 Slab Spans	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Over <input type="checkbox"/> Under	Bridge Posted For	Tons

I	ITEM	RATING	COMMENTS AND SKETCHES Refer to item number in comments and sketches Use additional sheets if necessary
	Substructure	8	(10) The south expansion hinge should be checked for excessive expansion at 90° or higher.
1	Footing		
2	Abutments	8	(11) Light rusting under the open hinge joints.
3	Wing Walls	8	
4	Piers	8	(12) The joints at the cover plates are leaking. 500 L.F. of the 1" median joint has fallen out.
5	Bridge Seats	8	(14 & 15) N.B.L. has been sealed but 800 L.F. of add'l cracks should be sealed and 8,000 L.F. of leaking transverse cracks in the S.B.L. should be sealed.
	Superstructure	7	
6	Trusses	8	
7	Girders	8	
8	Floor Beams	8	(17) Drains over the south bank are plugged and need cleaning. (Sand gets trapped in the horiz. troughs.
9	Stringers	8	
10	Bearing Devices	8	
11	Paint (Yr. Ptd. 1968)	7	
	Decks	7	
12	Expansion Joints	7	
13	Railing	8	
14	Structural Slab		
15	Wearing Surface		
16	Curb & Walk		
	Drains	7	
	Channel & Protection	8	
18	Area Under Bridge	8	
19	Stream Bed		
20	Slope Protection	8	
	Culverts		
21	Barrel & Floor		
22	Apron Wing Wall		
23	Retaining Wall		
24			
25			
26			
27			

Condition rating from 9 (very good) to 1 (very poor) for conditions noted  
 Rating of 9 ---- new condition  
 Rating of 8 ---- good condition - no repair necessary  
 Rating of 7 ---- some minor deterioration - repair by maintenance forces

Date: 11-29-72

Form 17108A (1-74)

Minnesota Department of Highways

## BRIDGE INSPECTION REPORT

☐ Original to Area Maintenance Engineer  
☐ First copy to Bridge Maint. Supervisor  
☐ Second copy to Bridge Inventory Group

Bridge No. 9340	T.H. No. 35W	Mile Post 18.54	Location 0.5 MI. N. OF JCT. I-94	Maintenance Area 5A
Type (104) 11 AHA SPANS 3 CONT. ST. BOX TRUSS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Over <input type="checkbox"/> Under	MISS. RIVER	Posted Limit in Tons	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> annual inspection <input type="checkbox"/> special inspection

I	ITEM	RATING	COMMENTS AND SKETCHES Refer to item number in comments and sketches Use additional sheets if necessary
	SUBSTRUCTURE	6 6 6 6	1) SO. ABUT. BRIDGE SEAT - CRACKING AND DISCOLORED.
1	Abutments	7 7 7 7	2) PIER 7 (FIXED PIER ON N.E. EDGE OF RIVER)
2	Piers	6 6 6 6	WEST COLUMN IS CRACKED VERTICALLY COMPLETELY THROUGH COLUMN.
	SUPERSTRUCTURE	7 7 7 7	3) SMALL AREAS OF SEVERE CORROSION OCCURRING, ESPECIALLY UNDER MEDIAN COIN. AND A SMALL AMOUNT OF CORROSION ON LOWER WEDG (EAST)
3	Trusses	7 7 7 7	4) JUST SOUTH OF PIER 8
4	Girders	N N N N	5) SOME OF THE JOINTS TOO TIGHT.
5	Floor Beams	7 7 7 7	6) DIST. & DEBR. UNDER ROLLER BEARINGS - NO INDICATION THAT BEAS ARE MOVING AS MUCH AS DESIGNED TO MOVE.
6	Stringers or Beams	8 8 8 8	7) 15-20% OF CONC. RAIL BASE IS UNSOUND.
7	Bearing Devices	7 7 7 7	8) 200-300 L.F. OF TRANSVERSE CRACKS IN LOW SWAMP OVERLAP -
	DECKS	6 6 6 6	9) FACE OF CURB STARTING TO SPALL IN SPOTS.
8	Expansion Joints	7 7 7 7	10) SEE 8) ABOVE - MAY BE A PAVEMENT PRESSURE PROBLEM.
9	Railing	6 6 6 6	11) NO HAZARD MARKERS
10	Structural Slab	8 7 6 6	12) 4-5% PAINT UNSOUND
11	Wearing Surface	7 7 7 7	13) DRAIN'S PERMANENTLY PLUGGED -
12	Curb & Walk	7 7 7 7	14) NO CHANGE.
	AREA UNDER BRIDGE	8 8 8 8	15) SEE 8) ABOVE. SOME OF THE PIER JOINTS AT RESS.
13	Channel & Protection	8 8 8 8	16) SEE 8) ABOVE.
14	Roadway, Railway, Other	8 8 8 8	17) SEE 8) ABOVE.
15	Slopes & Berms	8 8 8 8	18) SEE 8) ABOVE.
	CULVERTS	N N N N	19) SEE 8) ABOVE.
16	Barrel & Floor	N N N N	20) SEE 8) ABOVE.
17	Apron & Wings	N N N N	21) SEE 8) ABOVE.
	OTHER	7 7 7 7	22) SEE 8) ABOVE.
18	Retaining Wall	N N N N	23) SEE 8) ABOVE.
19	Approaches	7 7 7 7	24) SEE 8) ABOVE.
20	Signing	7 7 7 7	25) SEE 8) ABOVE.
21	Paint (yr. ptd.) 1968	7 7 7 7	26) SEE 8) ABOVE.
22	Drainage	7 7 6 6	27) SEE 8) ABOVE.
23	Guard Rail #5	8 8 8 8	28) SEE 8) ABOVE.
24	CONDUIT	8 8 8 8	29) SEE 8) ABOVE.
25			30) SEE 8) ABOVE.

Inspected by: [Signature] Date: 5/17/83

Date: 5/17/83

Date: 11/7/85



# Inspections

Form 17108 (12-71)

Minnesota Department of Highways

## 1972 BRIDGE INSPECTION REPORT

Prepare 4 copies:  
☐ Original to District Engineer  
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Bridge No. 9340	Check One: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> annual inspection <input type="checkbox"/> special inspection	Date 11-29-72	Year Built 1967
Maintenance Area 5A	T. H. No. 35W	Mile Post 18.43	Location 2 MI. N. of I-94
Type B.S. & 3 Slab Spans	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Over <input type="checkbox"/> Under	Bridge Posted For	Tons
Comments and Sketches Refer to item number in comments and sketches Use additional sheets if necessary			
I	ITEM	RATING	
	Substructure	8	(10) The south expansion hinge should be checked for excessive
1	Footing	8	(11) Light
2	Abutments	8	(12) The joint
3	Wing Walls	8	500 L.F. of
4	Piers	8	(14 & 15) N.B. of add'l crack of leaking trough should be sea.
5	Bridge Seats	8	(17) Drains need cleaning troughs.
6	Superstructure	7	
7	Trusses	8	
8	Girders	8	
9	Floor Beams	8	
10	Stringers	8	
11	Bearing Devices	8	
12	Paint (Yr. Ptd. 1968)	7	
13	Expansion Joints	7	
14	Railing	8	
15	Structural Slab		
16	Wearing Surface		
17	Curb & Walk		
18	Drains	7	
19	Channel & Protection	8	
20	Area Under Bridge	8	
21	Stream Bed		
22	Slope Protection	8	
23	Culverts		
24	Barrel & Floor		
25	Apron Wing Wall		
26	Retaining Wall		
27			
Inspected	Date: 11-29-72		

Condition rating from 9 (very good) to 0 (very poor) for conditions noted  
 Rating of 9 ---- new condition  
 Rating of 8 ---- good condition - no repair necessary  
 Rating of 7 ---- minor items in need of repair by maintenance forces  
 Rating of 6 ---- major items in need of repair by maintenance forces  
 Rating of 5 ---- major repair needed to be let  
 Rating of 4 ---- minimum adequate to tolerate present traffic - immediate rehabilitation necessary to keep open  
 Rating of 3 ---- inadequate to tolerate present heavy load - warrants closing bridge to traffic  
 Rating of 2 ---- inadequate to tolerate any load - warrants closing bridge to all traffic  
 Rating of 1 ---- bridge requires, if desirable to reopen to traffic  
 Rating of 0 ---- bridge conditions beyond repair - danger of immediate collapse  
 Place dash where item is not rated

Form 17108A (1-74)

Minnesota Department of Highways


## BRIDGE INSPECTION REPORT

Original to Area Maintenance Engineer  
 First copy to Bridge Maint. Supervisor  
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

Bridge No. 9340 5' 9340A	T.H. No. 35W	Mile Post 18.54	Location 0.5 MI. N. OF JCT. I-94	Maintenance Area 5A
Type (104) 11 AAS STAINS 3 CONT ST. ON TRUSS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Over <input type="checkbox"/> Under	MISS. RIVER	Posted Limit in Tons	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> annual inspection <input type="checkbox"/> special inspection
Comments and Sketches Refer to item number in comments and sketches Use additional sheets if necessary				
I	ITEM	RATING		
	Substructure	6 6 6 6	1) SO. ABUT. BRIDGE SEAT - CRACKING AND DISCOLORED.	
1	Abutments	7 7 7 7	2) NO. EDGE OF RIVER) USED VERTICALLY AS GROUNDLINE. SEE DESCRIPTION UNDER MEDIAN AMOUNT OF INFLUENCE (EAST) - 8	
6	Superstructure		3) NO TIGHT. NO COLLISION THAT MUCH AS DESIGNED	
7	Trusses		4) PAIL BASE IS (TRANSVERSE CRACKS) - PARTIAL TO SPALL	
8	Girders		5) BE A PAVEMENT	
9	Floor Beams		6) NO CHANGE. THE HIER LAPS THE BRIDGE - STAIN STAINS ARE PLUGGED.	
10	Stringers		7) NO CHANGE. THE HIER LAPS THE BRIDGE - STAIN STAINS ARE PLUGGED.	
11	Bearing Devices		8) NO CHANGE. THE HIER LAPS THE BRIDGE - STAIN STAINS ARE PLUGGED.	
12	Paint (Yr. Ptd. 1968)		9) NO CHANGE. THE HIER LAPS THE BRIDGE - STAIN STAINS ARE PLUGGED.	
21	Paint (yr. ptd.) 1968	7 7 7 7	10) CRACKING OUT OF THE RETAINING SLAB IN SEVERAL PLACES (NORTH END OF BRIDGE)	
22	Drainage	7 7 6 6	11) BOTTOM OF SLAB CRACK, 5' MEDIAN DETECTION - RATING IN MANY PLACES - ESPECIALLY NORTH END	
23	Guard Rail #5	8 8 8 8		
24	CONDUIT	8 8 8 8		
25				
Inspected by	Date 5/17/84			
	Date 11/7/85			
ESTIMATED COST OF REPAIR (NEW)			REVIEWED	
Labor	Material	Equipment	Total	By Engineer

# Bridge condition - superstructure

◆ Superstructure condition rating




# Bridge condition - status



# Inspections – fracture critical

## *Fracture Critical Bridge Inspection Report*



*Bridge # 9340  
I-35W over the Mississippi River  
(Downtown Minneapolis)*

*September 1998*




*Minnesota Department of Transportation  
Bridge Inspection, Maintenance Operations  
Metro Division*



# Inspections – fracture critical

## *Fracture Critical Bridge Inspection Report*



*Bridge # 9340  
I-35W over the Mississippi River  
(Downtown Minneapolis)*

*September 1998*



*Minnesota Department of Transportation  
Bridge Inspection, Maintenance Operations  
Metro Division*

1994: Bridge classed as  
'fracture critical' and  
'non-load-path-redundant'

Failure of critical member  
expected to result in  
collapse of bridge

# Fatigue / redundancy studies





Figure 7: Gaged Locations on the Main Truss

Physical testing and modelling conducted by University of Minnesota



# **"Budget Buster"**

## **Major TH Bridges Requiring Replacement or Renovation in the Next 10 Years**

D7	TH 169/Minnesota at Le Sueur	2005
Metro	TH 36/St Croix at Stillwater	2007
D2	TH 11/Red River at Robbin	2008
Metro	TH 52/Mississippi in St Paul - Lafayette	2010
D6	I90/Mississippi at Dresbach	2010
Metro	I 35E/Cayuga St & RR in St Paul	2010
Metro	I35W/Mississippi in Minneapolis	2012
Metro	TH 61/Mississippi at Hastings	2014

# “Without warning”?

- ‘Structurally deficient’ status since 1991
- Identified as fracture critical and non-load-path-redundant
- Extensive studies carried out on fatigue and redundancy
- Identified for replacement as a ‘budget buster’



# “Without warning”?

- ‘Structurally deficient’ status since 1991
- Identified as fracture critical and non-load-path-redundant
- Extensive studies carried out on fatigue and redundancy
- Identified for replacement as a ‘budget buster’
- No improvement to ‘deficient’ rating over 16 years despite work and studies on structure

# Investigations





# Inspection reports - 2004

## Panel Point #13 (East Truss):

Water from deck drains fall directly into river. [99/2002] Bottom chord gusset plate has section loss, flaking & pack rust. [1999] Truss bottom chord member L13/L14 has cracked tack welds at two interior stiffeners. [2004] Bottom chord member L13/L14 cracked tack weld @ diagram tab (diagram #12). Cracked tack weld @ diagram tab member L13/U14 see photos.

Bottom Chord Connection Condition



Member L13/L14 Cracked Tack Weld

2004 Bridge Inspection  
Bridge #9340

-23-





# Inspection reports - 2004

## Panel Point #13 (East Truss):

Water from deck drains fall directly into river. [99/2002] Bottom chord gusset plate has section loss, flaking & pack rust. [1999] Truss bottom chord member L13/L14 has cracked tack welds at two interior stiffeners. [2004] Bottom chord member L13/L14 cracked tack weld @ diagram tab (diagram #1?). Cracked tack weld @ diagram tab member L13/U14 see photos.

Bottom Chord Connection Condition



**Panel Point #13 (East Truss):**  
Water from deck drains fall directly into river. [99/2002]

Bottom chord gusset plate has section loss, flaking & pack rust.


[1999] Truss bottom chord member L13/L14 has cracked tack welds at two interior stiffeners. [2004] Bottom chord member L13/L14 cracked tack weld @ diagram tab (diagram #1?). Cracked tack weld @ diagram tab member L13/U14 see photos.




# Inspection reports - 2005

## Panel Point #13 (East Truss):

Water from deck drains fall directly into river. [99/2002] Bottom chord gusset plate has section loss, flaking & pack rust. [1999] Truss bottom chord member L13/L14 has cracked tack welds at two interior stiffeners. [2004] Bottom chord member L13/L14 cracked tack weld @ diagram tab (diagram #17). Cracked tack weld @ diagram tab member L13/U14 see photos.



Bottom Chord Connection Condition



Member L13/L14 Cracked Tack Weld




Member L13/U14 Cracked Tack Weld

METRO DISTRICT MAINTENANCE


2004 Bridge Inspection  
Bridge #9340 -23-

## Panel Point #13 (East Truss):

Water from deck drains fall directly into river. [99/2002] Bottom chord gusset plate has section loss, flaking & pack rust. [1999] Truss bottom chord member L13/L14 has cracked tack welds at two interior stiffeners. [2004] Bottom chord member L13/L14 cracked tack weld @ diagram tab (diagram #17). Cracked tack weld @ diagram tab member L13/U14 see photos.



Condition @Bottom Chord Connection



Member L13/L14 Cracked Tack Weld



2005 Bridge Inspection  
Bridge #9340


-23-

2005 Bridge Inspection  
Bridge #9340 -23-


# Inspection reports - 2006

## Panel Point #13 (East Truss):

Water from deck drains fall directly into river. [99/2002] Bottom chord gusset plate has section loss, flaking & pack rust. [1999] Truss bottom chord member L13/L14 has cracked tack welds at two interior stiffeners. [2004] Bottom chord member L13/L14 cracked tack weld @ diagram tab (diagram #17). Cracked tack weld @ diagram tab member L13/U14 see photos.



Bottom Chord Connection Condition



Member L13/L14 Cracked Tack Weld



Member L13/U14 Cracked Tack Weld

METRO DISTRICT MAINTENANCE

2004 Bridge Inspection  
Bridge #9340 -23-

## Panel Point #12 (East Truss):


[1999] Truss bottom chord member L12/L13 has a cracked tack weld at an interior stiffener. [2004] Ground out pit from past inspection.




Weld Ground Out

## Panel Point #13 (East Truss):

Water from deck drains fall directly into river. [1999] Truss bottom chord member L13/L14 has cracked tack welds at two interior stiffeners. [99/2002] Bottom chord gusset plate has section loss, flaking & pack rust. [2004] Bottom chord member L13/L14 has cracked tack weld @ diagram tab. Cracked tack weld @ diagram tab member L13/U14. See photos. [2006] Bottom chord member L13/L14 has a missing bird cover.



Condition @ Bottom Chord Connection



Member L13/U14 Cracked Tack Weld

METRO DISTRICT MAINTENANCE

2006 Bridge Inspection  
Bridge #9340 -24-

2006 Bridge Inspection  
Bridge #9340

-24-

# Global analysis



## Minneapolis I-35W Bridge

← North-

U10'

U10

Pier 7

L11'


L11

Pier 6


Mississippi River

987 feet

N A T I O N A L   T R A N S P O R T A T I O N   S A F E T Y   B O A R D



# Gusset plate FE model






# Gusset plate U10W - 2003




# Gusset plate U10W - 2003





North

Pre-Collapse




North

L11W

Collapse Video - Frame #1






North

L11W

Collapse Video - Frame #2






North

L11W

Collapse Video - Frame #3



North


L11W

Collapse Video - Frame #4



North

Collapse Video - Frame #5





North

Collapse Video - Frame #6





North

Collapse Video - Frame #7



North

Collapse Video - Frame #8






North


Collapse Video - Frame #9

North

Collapse Video - Frame #10







North

Collapse Video - Frame #11

# Probable cause

Accident report determined cause to be:

- inadequate load capacity of the gusset plates at the U10 nodes
- due to design error

Failure occurred under combination of:

- substantial weight increases due to bridge modifications
- concentrated construction loads



# “Without warning”?

Bridge owner concerned about:

- ‘Structurally deficient’ condition rating
- Fatigue cracking

These factors did not contribute to the collapse

# Assumptions on gusset plates

The bridge designer (design checker):

“...joints are typically stronger than the members they connect ... believe the detailer was a relatively new employee”



# Assumptions on gusset plates

The bridge inspector:

“...that’s fit up, that’s original construction ... the reason we made that determination is, one, from me from undergrad, gusset plates are oversized. The factor safeties within those gusset plates are 2 to 3.”



# Assumptions on gusset plates

The standards writers:

“...the AASHTO Guide for Commonly Recognized Structural Elements does not include gusset plates as a bridge structural element requiring specific attention and subsequent condition rating during bridge inspections.”





# Assumptions on gusset plates

The software writers:

“...commonly used computer programs for load rating analysis do not include gusset plates ... the resulting load ratings might not accurately reflect the actual capacity of the structure.”



# Assumptions on gusset plates

The bridge owner:

“...because bridge owners generally consider gusset plates to be designed more conservatively than the other members of a truss ... bridge owners typically ignore gusset plates when performing load ratings”



# Learning from failure

Federal Highway Administration issues technical advisory (15 Jan 2008). Gusset plate capacity to be checked on non-load-path-redundant truss bridges:

- for new/replacement bridges during initial load rating
- for future load rating calculations for changes in condition or dead load
- review previous calculations for bridges subject to significant changes in stress levels

# Grand River Bridge, Ohio

- Gusset plates buckled on 24 May 1996
- Construction traffic parked on bridge
- Gusset plate thickness inadequate





# Learning from failure?



- Bridge repaired with thicker gusset plates
- Importance of inspecting gusset plates emphasised in Ohio bridge inspector training
- Article in Sept 1997 Civil Engineering magazine



# Boulevard de la Concorde overpass, Montreal













**Failure in thick slab**

**Half-joint intact**









a)



# Causes - poor anchoring detail

Reinforcement detailing:


- not in accordance with best practice
- inadequately anchored
- but did not contravene 1966 code



# Causes - misplaced reinforcing bars

As-built reinforcement:

- hanger bars misplaced
- created unreinforced zone of weakness



# Contributory physical causes

- Absence of shear reinforcement in thick slab
- Absence of proper waterproofing
- Damages induced by repair work



# Inspections

“the inspection reports ... show significant deficiencies and are not compliant with the manuals”

*Montreal Commission of Inquiry*

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“the inspection reports ... show significant deficiencies and are not compliant with the manuals”

*Montreal Commission of Inquiry*

“MnDOT did not follow its own policies with respect to documenting the deteriorating condition of the bridge”

*Minnesota Legislature Investigative Report*



# Repair work – Feb 1992



# Special inspection – 15 July 2004



# Inspection – day of collapse



# UK infrastructure



# Bridge management issues

“...numerous file-keeping flaws in the case of the de la Concorde overpass”

*Montreal Commission of Inquiry*



# Bridge management issues

“...numerous file-keeping flaws in the case of the de la Concorde overpass”

“The absence of a complete file accessible to the ...inspectors ... was a key factor that contributed to the lack of follow-up on the progressive deterioration of the overpass”

*Montreal Commission of Inquiry*

# Bridge management issues

“...numerous file-keeping flaws in the case of the de la Concorde overpass”

“The absence of a complete file accessible to the ...inspectors ... was a key factor that contributed to the lack of follow-up on the progressive deterioration of the overpass”

“...many opportunities were missed throughout the years to investigate in detail the condition of the structure”

*Montreal Commission of Inquiry*

# Vulnerable structures

Montreal: Thick slabs without shear reinforcement

Minnesota: Gusset plates / non-load-path-redundant

“...the *Ministère* must better identify the structures that are at risk and award them special status in the management system”

*Montreal Commission of Inquiry*

# Design approval

“...the *Ministère* approved the preliminary design ... without anticipating the considerable difficulties that would result ... it did not assess the inspection problems that such a structure might involve”

# Design approval

“...the *Ministère* approved the preliminary design ... without anticipating the considerable difficulties that would result ... it did not assess the inspection problems that such a structure might involve”

“The Commission recommends that any mandate for structural design should specifically be validated (verification of designer’s concept, drawings and calculations)”

*Montreal Commission of Inquiry  
Recommendation 6*



# Design approval

“Develop and implement ... a bridge design quality assurance / quality control programme ... that includes procedures to detect and correct bridge design errors before the design plans are made final; and, at a minimum, provides a means for verifying that the appropriate design calculations have been performed, that the calculations are accurate...”

*National Transportation Safety Board  
Recommendation H-08-17*

# Technical approval

	TA prevent?
Poor anchoring detail of top bars	
Misplacement of bars	
Concrete not durable	
Absence of shear reinforcement	
Absence of proper waterproofing	
Damages induced by repair work	
Use of half-joints	

# Technical approval

	TA prevent (1968)?
Poor anchoring detail of top bars	✓
Misplacement of bars	
Concrete not durable	✓
Absence of shear reinforcement	
Absence of proper waterproofing	
Damages induced by repair work	N/A
Use of half-joints	

# Technical approval

	TA prevent (1968)?
Poor anchoring detail of top bars	✓
Misplacement of bars	×
Concrete not durable	✓
Absence of shear reinforcement	×
Absence of proper waterproofing	×
Damages induced by repair work	N/A
Use of half-joints	×

# Technical approval

	TA prevent (1968)?	TA prevent (2009)?
Poor anchoring detail of top bars	✓	✓
Misplacement of bars	×	
Concrete not durable	✓	✓
Absence of shear reinforcement	×	
Absence of proper waterproofing	×	
Damages induced by repair work	N/A	
Use of half-joints	×	



# Technical approval

	TA prevent (1968)?	TA prevent (2009)?
Poor anchoring detail of top bars	✓	✓
Misplacement of bars	×	
Concrete not durable	✓	✓
Absence of shear reinforcement	×	✓
Absence of proper waterproofing	×	✓
Damages induced by repair work	N/A	
Use of half-joints	×	✓

# Technical approval

	TA prevent (1968)?	TA prevent (2009)?
Poor anchoring detail of top bars	✓	✓
Misplacement of bars	×	?
Concrete not durable	✓	✓
Absence of shear reinforcement	×	✓
Absence of proper waterproofing	×	✓
Damages induced by repair work	N/A	?
Use of half-joints	×	✓

# Knowledge management

“The Commission recommends that the Government ensure that there be an effective surveillance of scientific intelligence processes and knowledge involving academics and top-level practitioners; this will ensure that persons responsible for designing and maintaining structures ... be kept constantly informed of new developments and changes in standards and practices”

*Montreal Commission of Inquiry  
Recommendation 3*

# Knowledge management

“The Minnesota Legislature should request the Federal Highway Administration to gather information on all major bridge deficiencies, as they become known, and to share the information with all state departments of transportation to assure systematic and timely incorporation of newly developed safety concerns into state bridge inspection practices”

*Minnesota Legislature Investigative Report  
Recommendation 4a*

# Reassessment

	TA prevent (1968)?	TA prevent (2009)?
Poor anchoring detail of top bars	✓	✓
Misplacement of bars	×	?
Concrete not durable	✓	✓
Absence of shear reinforcement	×	✓
Absence of proper waterproofing	×	✓
Damages induced by repair work	N/A	?
Use of half-joints	×	✓





# Construction issues

“...the Commission is of the opinion that the best supervision practice was the one provided for in DSA’s contract for professional services, namely the full-time presence of supervisors on site”

*Montreal Commission of Inquiry*



# Learning the lessons from bridge collapses



Minnesota  
*I35W Highway  
bridge*



Montreal  
*de la Concorde  
overpass*

# Key issues

- Assumptions
- Quality of bridge management
- Vulnerable structures
- Load-carrying evaluation
- Knowledge management
- Design validation

# References

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