

#### Building a Safer Future

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#### Structural-Safety Group





#### SCOSS

Standing Committee on Structural Safety

- Founded 1976
- Collects data from public sources
- Does unacceptable risk exist?
- Publishes Alerts and Topic Papers


#### **CROSS**

Confidential Reporting on Structural Safety

- Started 2005
- Collects confidential data
- Provides comments on lessons to be learned
- Maintains report database
- Publishes Newsletters

**Voluntary Committee and Panel Members** 

#### **Aviation Safety Reporting System**





#### Pyramid of Risk






Diagram courtesy of ASRS

\* Precursors should be reported internally and can be reported to CROSS


#### From Design to End of Life













#### Reported Concerns or Events



#### City Gates - SCOSS Alert Structural Stability/Integrity of Steel Frame Buildings



#### City Gates - SCOSS Alert Sudden Collapse



#### Edinburgh Schools - 2016



#### **Tower Block Tragedies**



Ronan Point 1968



**Grenfell Tower 2017** 

#### Key issues

#### **Ronan Point**

- Large Panel Structure with no inherent robustness
- Progressive collapse following relatively minor gas explosion
- World-wide influence on robustness
- Remaining LPS buildings now under renewed scrutiny

#### **Grenfell Tower**

- Multiple fire risk problems
- Divided responsibilities
- Immense societal implications
- Fire safety world-wide will change
- Building Regulations will change
- Attitude to risk will change

design, construction, management in use, and ownership

## Initial Government actions

- The Grenfell Tower Inquiry independent public inquiry
- The Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety led by Dame Judith Hackitt.

#### Lakenal House 2009



**Precursor** 

#### Cladding Fires




Lacrosse Tower Melbourne 2014



Dubai hotel 2015


#### **Precursors**

#### Section through Grenfell external wall



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#### DCLG/BRE Fire Tests 2017



#### Test No. 1 Stopped After 395 Seconds - Failed

100 mm rigid polyisocyanurate (PIR) foam insulation boards


4mm aluminium composite material (ACM) panels with polyethylene (PE) filler



#### Test No. 4 Stopped After 1 Hour - Passed

180mm stone wool insulation board

4mm ACM panels with fire retardant filler



#### Liverpool Echo Arena Car Park Fire - December 2017




#### Liverpool Echo Arena Car Park Fire - December 2017



Hydro-carbon fire


1,150 cars destroyed





### Typical floor plan

#### Reinforced concrete construction





#### Elios collision tolerant drone




#### Vertical discontinuity





#### John Hancock Center Chicago Car Fire on 7<sup>th</sup> Floor – February 2018





Hackitt review-Building Regulations and Fire Safety

Evidence submitted by Structural-Safety and IStructE using SCOSS and CROSS data;

- Intrinsically safe by design
- Safe to build
- Safe through life

## Final Hackitt Report


- Roles and responsibilities for safety unclear;
- Regulations and guidance are ambiguous;
- Compliance with the regulations is weak;
- Competence is patchy;
- Product testing, labelling and marketing is opaque;
- Residents' voices go unheard, even when safety issues are identified.

#### Hackitt Recommendations

SCOSS Alert Building a Safer Future

- Stronger and tougher regulatory framework
- New Joint Regulatory Group(JCA) [Originally JCA]
- Safety case approach
- Clear responsibilities to manage on-going safety
- CROSS reporting for all buildingd
- Golden thread

#### Eindhoven Airport Car Park - 2017



#### Dutch Safety Board


- ensuring all forms of safety in construction projects;
- the importance of organising professional discussions;
- the principles of systemic risk management;
- transitioning from a blame culture to a learning culture;
- embedding safety in tendering procedures.
- hold participants explicitly accountable for complying with these principles.

# Shergold Weir Report - Australia 2018

"The quality of buildings depends heavily on the competency and integrity of builders."

#### Opel Tower Sydney - Christmas 2018





#### Damaged walls




"A number of design and construction issues have been identified, a combination of which probably caused the observed damage."



#### In Plain Sight: reducing the risk of infrastructure failure

- Commissioned by ICE
- While the risk of a major failure of UK infrastructure is relatively low, it is still not low enough.
- Build on the work of Structural-Safety

#### Grim reminder – Polcevera viaduct



#### Pyramid of Risk




Diagram courtesy of ASRS

<sup>\*</sup> Precursors should be reported internally and can be reported to CROSS

#### Hong Kong MTR

Commission of Inquiry into the Diaphragm Wall and Platform Slab Construction Works at the Hung Hom Station Extension under the Shatin to Central Link Project




## Government Statement on Hackitt December 2018

- Take forward all of the recommendations in the Hackitt review
- Create a more effective regulatory and accountability framework
- Introduce clearer standards and guidance, including a new Standards Committee
- Put residents at the heart of the new system of building safety
- Help to create a culture change and a more responsible building industry, from design, through to construction and management.

#### High Rise Residential Buildings (HRRBs)

- Largest category is existing Large Panel Structure Buildings
- Research into numbers and condition underway
- Potential risk is progressive collapse due to gas explosion
- Other risks may exist
- Programme of assessment to be undertaken
- Safety case analysis
- Complex task.

#### LPS Buildings Haringey




### LPS Building Portsmouth



#### LPS Buildings Ledbury Towers



#### Initial concern



#### Pyramid of Risk




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#### LPS demolition 2009 – CROSS report





# LPS gas explosion Astrakhan Russia 2012





https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2107318/Two-dead-11-missing-blast-rips-old-Soviet-style-block-Russia.html



#### LPS gas explosion Izhevsk Russia 2017



https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-tower-block-collapse-gas-explosion-izhevsk-western-urals-victims-survivors-rescue-a8045911.html

LPS Gas Explosion Magnitogorsk Russia January 2019



https://www.dailysabah.com/europe/2019/01/03/death-toll-hits-39-in-russian-gas-explosion-as-rescue-operation-ends

Gas Explosion Shakhty Russia January

2019



https://www.nst.com.my/world/2019/01/450474/one-dead-four-missing-russia-gas-blast

## Consequences from Hackitt

- Changes to Building Regulations initially structure and fire
- Safety cases for HRRBs
- Improvements in competency
- Change in culture
- Stronger penalties for non-compliance
- More safety reporting
- Digital records of everything

### Consequences from Hansford


- Strongly promotes the Swiss Cheese Model
- Build on the work of Structural-Safety
- Highlight unaddressed infrastructure concerns, risks and near misses
- Work with Government to identify any new safety-critical asset classes requiring lifecycle statutory certification
- Set out the responsibilities of a competent infrastructure owner



- Consider risks of both known and unforeseen events
- Consider the risks of unexpected consequences
- Review risk when circumstances change e.g. new materials, new forms of construction, emerging technologies
- Release safety-critical information that could help others - CROSS

#### **CROSS International**












































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